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The article by Felbermayr and Steininger analyses 
the effects the EMU (and thus the Euro) had not only 
on trade in the EU, but also on real per capita income 
(described as ‘welfare effects’ in the title). Using 
sectoral trade data for 34 goods and service sectors 
from 1995 to 2014, and applying a structural gravity 
model, the authors were able to reveal that internal 
trade in goods increased, on average, by eight percent in 
the EU as a result of the economic and monetary union. 
While the effects on trade in goods were significant, 
they were much less pronounced for trade in services. 
What is common among all countries, however, is that 
the economic and monetary union has led to higher 
real income across the board, in all EMU countries. 
Unsurprisingly, there is a pronounced difference among 
the member states. What is surprising, however, is, 
that, on a per capita basis, it is not Germany that has 
benefitted the most from the economic and monetary 
union – as often proclaimed by Eurosceptics – but 
countries like Luxembourg. While real income rose by 
0.6 percent in Germany due to the EMU, this figure was 
3.5 times higher in Luxembourg, showing an impressive 
growth of 2.1 percent. In terms of real income growth, 
Germany is not only far behind smaller centrally 
located EU countries such as Luxembourg, Belgium 
(+1.43% real income) and the Netherlands (+1.16), but 
is below average, with only six of the remaining 18 
Eurozone member states having experienced smaller 
growth figures. Even peripheral countries that have 
suffered tremendously from the Eurozone crisis, such 
as Portugal, reveal a higher real income growth than 
Germany. 
Similarly, Germany also does not take the lead in 
real GDP growth attributable to the single currency. 
Felbermayr and Steininger’s data suggest that real 
GDP would have been 0.6 percent lower in Germany 
in 2014 had it not joined the EMU. Similar to the 
aforementioned real wage increases, this is significantly 
lower than in Belgium or Luxembourg, where EMU 
membership increased real GDP by 1.4 and 2.1 percent, 
respectively. 
While differences in real GDP growth due to the 
currency union exit, it should be highlighted that all 
EMU members experienced both a rise in real GDP 
and in real income that can be attributed to EMU 
membership. Much of these gains come from lower 
transaction costs and an increase in trade volume 
among the member states, partially from trade diversion 
with non-EU states, and partially from an increase in 
existing intra-EU trade. Yet, despite the aforementioned 
trade diversion from non-EMU countries, even EU 
members that did not join the Eurozone could see some 
welfare gains, albeit on a much lower level. 
The second surprising finding of the study was 
that while trade-related transaction costs, on average, 
decreased significantly, this was not true to the same 
extent for outward and inward trade costs. The authors 
discuss this at the example of Germany, where “outward 
trade costs of Germany have fallen quite substantially” 
while inward trade costs did not decrease significantly.
The third unexpected result of the study was that the 
increase in trade levels did not only vary significantly 
among the EMU countries, but that there were strong 
disparities in trade growth among the ‘old’ EMU 
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countries (Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, 
Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, and 
Spain) and the ‘new’ ones (Greece, Slovenia, Malta, 
Cyprus, Slovakia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania). Even 
accounting for the fact that the Euro was introduced 
much later in the ‘new’ EMU countries, a factor that 
limited trade growth as compared to the ‘old’ EMU 
countries, the differences are stark. In several cases, 
trade between old and new EMU states even decreased 
significantly between 1995 and 2014. This can be 
highlighted at the example of Germany, Europe’s 
biggest trading nation. While German trade with old 
Eurozone members increased by 13.8 percent in goods 
and by 7.2 percent in services due to the EMU, it 
decreased by double-digit figures with the new EMU 
member states both in goods (manufacturing sector) 
and services (by -11.5% and 10.5%, respectively). 
In other words, while German trade with old EMU 
member states show a statistically significant increase 
in both goods and services, trade with Germany’s 
eastern neighbors using the Euro decreased due to 
the currency union. This is not only true for German 
exports, but also for imports from the new EMU 
member states. According to the authors’ model, this 
is because transaction costs in trade between Germany 
and the new EMU members did not decrease, as well as 
because trade diversion to the old EMU member states 
had taken place before countries in Eastern Europe 
joined the Euro. 
Felbermayr and Steininger ’s paper is highly 
interesting in many respects and the authors reveal 
several counter-intuitive findings, as presented 
above. While the Euro is mostly portrayed as having 
enhanced trade among the Eurozone members in 
many academic papers and official publications by the 
European Commission, Felbermayr and Steininger’s 
account is more balanced, highlighting not only 
that not all countries benefitted equally from their 
Eurozone membership, but also that only a handful of 
industries experienced a rise in trade, while numerous 
others – not only the service industry, but also most 
non-manufacturing industries – did not experience a 
significant increase in trade, at least not in the case of 
Germany. 
The fact that trade between numerous old EMU 
member states and the new Eurozone members did 
not increase for several countries, however, does not 
mean that the new members of the currency union did 
not benefit from it. This is highlighted by the authors, 
who argue that the “formation of EMU strengthened 
the region in terms of purchasing power, which led to 
an increase of imports from the non-EMU members”. 
They also show that especially the Baltic states, in 
particular Estonia, experienced a considerable increase 
in real income through the Euro – although Estonia had 
only been a Eurozone member for three years in 2014. 
Despite its generally solid research design, the 
study has a major shortcoming: the time period 
analysed in the paper. Looking at bilateral sectoral 
trade data from 1995 to 2014, the results do not take 
into account most of the developments after the Euro 
was introduced in several new EMU states. Latvia and 
Lithuania, for example, only introduced the EURO in 
2014 and 2015, respectively. This late timing renders 
it hard to adequately reflect the effects the introduction 
of the Euro had on trade with other currency union 
members. Such different timing in regard to the Euro 
introduction, which spans from 1999 (when Austria, 
Belgium, Finland, France, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, 
Netherlands, Portugal, and Spain joined the Eurozone) 
and 2015, when Lithuania became the last EMU 
member, distorts the effects the EMU had on trade in 
the EU. While the authors take the different timing of 
EMU accession into account through dummy variables 
“accounting for membership in the EU, the Schengen 
Area or other regional trade agreements”, it would have 
been advisable to extend the time period analysed in 
this paper as to better reflect the actual changes in trade 
after the EMU accession of the Baltic states. 
Another point that could be improved is the 
grouping of the EMU member states, especially in 
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regard to Greece, which was classified as ‘new’ EMU 
state. While Greece could not move to Stage Three 
(the irrevocable fixing of the exchange rate between 
national currencies and the Euro) in 1999 for not 
meeting the convergence criteria, it joined the Euro 
area only two years later, in 2001, and introduced the 
Euro as actual currency on 1 January 2002, together 
with 11 other EU15 members. Considering that Greece 
became a member of Stage One and Stage Two together 
with all other 14 EU15 countries, and only had Stage 
Three delayed by two years, it would make more sense 
to group Greece into the old EMU countries rather 
than considering it a new EMU country, where some 
countries only joined the Eurozone 14 years after 
Greece. 
Lastly, it would have been desirable to have more 
information on why trade among many old and new 
EMU countries decreased. While the authors point 
out that, for example, trade between Germany and the 
new Eurozone member states significantly decreased 
(-11.5% in manufacturing sectors, and -10.5% in 
services sectors), the reasons are not expressed clearly. 
The reader is thus left in the dark whether this was due 
to trade diversion towards old EMU countries or non-
EMU states, or whether there are other explanations. 
It is also unclear why trade in manufacturing between 
Germany and the new EMU members decreased in 
some areas but not in others. 
Despite these shortcomings, Felbermayr and 
Steininger’s paper is highly interesting – in some 
respect, even eye-opening – and methodologically 
convincing. Rather than focusing on the monetary 
e f f ec t s  o f  t he  Eu ro  and  i t s  mac roeconomic 
consequences, it provides a much-needed analysis of 
how the currency union has increased real GDP in its 
member states. Contrasting the observed baseline from 
2014 with a counterfactual situation without the Euro, 
they were able to prove that all EMU member states – 
even those who joined later and those who suffered the 
most during the Eurozone crisis – benefitted from the 
Euro in terms of higher real per capita income and GDP, 
showing the “‘real’ effects of the common currency”, 
so the authors. 
Even with the heterogeneity between different 
sectors and countries, the finding that all EMU member 
states (no matter whether old or new, small or big), 
benefitted from the Euro in terms of welfare effects, 
is highly important as it contradicts two major claims 
that have been on the rise since the Eurozone crisis. 
Firstly, it provides evidence that also countries in 
the South, such as Greece, Spain, Portugal or Italy, 
which experienced a significant decline in GDP 
during the Eurozone crisis, overall had their welfare 
(real per capita income) increased through the single 
currency. Second, it denounces claims that the Euro 
predominantly benefitted Germany, often at the expense 
of smaller EU member states, as the data clearly 
highlight the opposite, revealing that Germany’s gains 
in terms of real GDP and real income were below 
average, below those of most smaller EMU nations in 
central or eastern Europe. 
The data the authors generate through their 
structural gravity modeling plays a major role in helping 
citizens, politicians and academics discuss the Euro 
from a more balanced perspective and could be used to 
remind everyone, especially the Eurosceptics, that the 
EMU has increased people’s average purchasing power 
in all member states, thereby strengthening the region 
and often improving peoples’ lives. It is a much-needed 
paper in current times, where both the EU and the 
Eurozone has been assessed increasingly negatively in 
light of its assumed ‘failures’ and can provide impetus 
for analysis on how to further decrease transaction costs 
in intra-EMU trade. 
